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ABSTRACT
The article contributes a critical analysis of the case law of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), reviewing the protection
of migrants’ rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System.
Specifically, the article’s aim is to scrutinise the possible
constraints upon growth as regards the role played by the IACtHR.
It examines the main drivers behind the evolution of the case law
and the key principles laid down in emblematic cases with a view
to answering this question. The article also discusses the
articulation of a judicial dialogue between the IACtHR and its
European counterpart, which has developed the jurisprudence on
both sides. Evidence demonstrates that the IACtHR is being
innovative in creating its own authentic judicial dialogue with
national constitutional courts. Other regional human rights
systems, such as the African system, could learn from this. Finally,
the article identifies the success and the pitfalls in the approach
taken to protect migrants’ rights.
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1. Introduction
Since it was established in 1979 by the American Convention of Human Rights (ACHR,
also known as the ‘San Jose Pact’),1 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR,
or the Court) has developed a rich case law following its first ruling in the Velásquez
Rodríguez case in 1988, which inaugurated a period of incessant activity.2
Although the IACtHR focused initially on the investigation of mass human rights vio-
lations in cases of authoritarian regimes, it has extended the scope of its activities over the
years to deal with cases concerning economic, social and cultural rights applying the Pro-
tocol of San Salvador on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.3 Hence, the IACtHR’s case
law has reflected the transition to democracy of many Latin American countries support-
ing the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law across the continent and has
addressed other aspects of safeguarding human rights in the Americas. These include,
among others, migrants’ rights, environmental protection and indigenous peoples’
rights. This extensive legacy of judicial activity permits a critical examination of the evol-
ution in the exercise of the IACtHR’s functions.
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The article’s main aim is to contribute a thorough analysis of the case law of the
IACtHR and to review relevant aspects concerning the recognition and protection of
asylum seekers, refugees and migrants’ rights in the Inter-American Human Rights
System (IAHRS).4 The article looks into the main drivers behind the evolution of the
case law, identifying both the successes and the pitfalls in the methods of interpretation
developed to protect migrants’ human rights. Specifically, the article scrutinises the poss-
ible constraints upon growth as regards the role played by the IACtHR.
The article contends that, in its evolution, the IACtHR’s activity has been driven by four
factors: a flexible approach taken when applying various methods of interpretation; an
increased judicial dialogue with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and con-
tracting states’ courts; an enhanced collaboration with the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR, or the IA Commission); and the affirmation of core inter-
national human rights law principles through its advisory opinions. To scrutinise this
evolution properly, the analysis focuses on the protection of migrants, an area in which
the maturity of the IACtHR can be rightly appreciated. The Court’s maturity relates to
its evolving interpretations of regional and United Nations (UN) human rights instru-
ments to broaden the scope of protection and the improvement of the compliance and
monitoring procedures. Its role in the protection of migrants is of particular interest
when we consider ongoing refugee crises in Europe and other regional areas. In examining
the evolution, the early landmark cases have laid the groundwork for the development of
steady case law on the protection of migrants’ rights.
In particular, the article examines the key principles of the IACtHR’s case law that can
be inferred from an analysis of emblematic cases. It also discusses the articulation of a judi-
cial dialogue between the IACtHR and the ECtHR. Evidence demonstrates that the
IACtHR is not only emulating its European counterpart, but, that the ECtHR cites the
IACtHR jurisprudence. More importantly, the IACtHR is being innovative and developing
its own authentic judicial dialogue with national courts of the contracting states.5
This will be of interest to international jurists for several reasons, not least that the
ECtHR has begun to draw innovative insights from IACtHR jurisprudence on procedural
issues which concern migrants, such as its expansive interpretations of the principle of
non-retroactivity and the right to a fair procedure before collective expulsion. Further-
more, the strong judicial dialogue which the IACtHR has established with the supreme
and constitutional courts of its contracting states can provide a valuable model for
other regional human rights systems.
The article first provides an overview of the evolution of the IACtHR’s role in the insti-
tutional framework of the IAHRS in Section 2. Section 3 then analyses the protection of
migrants’ rights in the case law of the IACtHR, underscoring the main features in the prac-
tice of the Court. Finally, section 4 discusses and critiques the interpretation tools devel-
oped by the IACtHR to resolve human rights claims. Conclusions are summarised in
section 5.
2. The IACtHR’s evolution at a glance: finding a way to cope with teething
troubles
Overall, the creation of the IACtHR represented significant progress in the protection of
human rights within the institutional framework of the IAHRS.6 Certainly, the IACtHR
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completed the human rights system created under the Organization of American States
(OAS), adding to the Inter-American Commission, which in 1959 began promoting
and protecting human rights as an autonomous organ of the OAS and thus with compe-
tence to supervise the protection of human rights in all the member states.7 The IACtHR
as a treaty body with voluntary jurisdiction is designed as an international tribunal in
charge of the monitoring of compliance with the respective treaty.
In contrast, the IACHR, as a committee of experts, has traditionally exercised a far-
reaching role in the promotion and protection of human rights under Article 106 of the
OAS Charter overseeing compliance with the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man (ADHR) without the need for them to further ratify a treaty or
accept its jurisdiction like in the case of the IACtHR.8
Precisely as Burgorgue-Larsen and Ubeda de Torres recall, unlike the European Com-
mission on Human Rights that required acceptance of its jurisdiction for the submission of
individual applications, ‘the Inter-American Commission has adopted the opposite
approach’: acceptance is only a condition for inter-state claims but not for individual
applications which are considered ‘a sort of actio popularis’.9 These central differences
have allowed the IACHR to develop a more dynamic role in the protection of human
rights than would have been feasible for its counterpart, the former Human Rights Com-
mission in Europe.10
Although inspired by the ECtHRmodel, the role of the IACtHR in the IAHRS possesses
specific features. Whereas the IACtHR can exercise its jurisdiction in contentious cases
and hand down advisory opinions, its European counterpart was only recently endowed
with advisory jurisdiction after the adoption of Protocol 16 in 2013.11 Also, the role of
the IACHR is quite different from the function played by the former Human Rights Com-
mission in Europe. Remarkably, the IACHR, as the human rights body to which individ-
uals have access, performs quasi-judicial functions over the admissibility of the claims and
on the merits of the petitions. Individuals have access to the IACHR only during the sub-
mission of the petitions since the procedures before the IACtHR can only be set in motion
by the state parties and the IACHR.12
Against this background, the IACtHR has evolved over the years from being a relatively
inactive judicial organ at the beginning of its functions to become an active and innovative
judicial body. Although the Court issued its first advisory opinion in 1982,13 it was only in
1988, nearly ten years after its establishment in 1979, that the IACtHR pronounced its first
ruling in a contentious case.14 Since these early beginnings, the IACtHR has been pro-
gressively exercising its jurisdiction to settle contentious cases and has re-affirmed the sig-
nificance of its role in the protection of human rights through advisory opinions.15 This
development has been prompted by various factors.
First, a flexible approach taken when applying various methods of interpretation has
paved the way for progress, giving judges greater scope to develop inter-American
human rights law in line with the ACHR. Hence, the IACtHR has pursued a progressive
treaty interpretation of the ACHR by way of the various hermeneutical methods set out in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and in light of the principles of the
ACHR. Hence, the IACtHR relies on a variety of interpretative methods, going beyond a
constrictive interpretation of the wording or the ACHR. Through a progressive interpret-
ation, according to which the wording should be construed in light of present conditions,
the IACtHR has established thresholds and tests to protect and balance different rights in
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conflict. Through this evolving interpretation of the ACHR, the Court has expanded the 
scope of protection. As Lixinski points out, this approach ‘permeates much of the Court’s 
activities, and it proposes some kind of hierarchy within international law in which inter-
national human rights law is at the top’.16 In a similar vein, Burgorgue-Larsen and Ubeda 
de Torres submit that even if the IAHRS was inspired by its European counterpart, a more 
liberal approach to the optional acceptance of the jurisdiction and interpretation of the 
provisions was taken, construed around the essential principle of human dignity as 
demonstrated by the IACtHR case law.17
Consequently the pro homine principle represents the most relevant interpretative tool 
put forward in article 29.1 and article 1.1 of the ACHR, whereby legal provisions must be 
read in the most advantageous manner to protect the human being.18 In its own words, the 
Court has established that the American Convention must be ‘interpreted in favour of the 
individual, who is the object of international protection as long as such an interpretation 
does not result in a modification of the system’.19 As Pasqualucci states ‘under the pro 
homine principle, the dignity of the individual is of primary concern when interpreting 
the rights specified in international human rights law and in the American Convention, 
in particular’.20
Arguably, by way of this flexible interpretation the wording of the human rights treaties 
can be stretched ad infinitum. Hence, the issue of regional consent (understood as ‘the 
consent of the relevant community of states as a factor in the interpretation of a 
human rights treaty’) has been raised as a necessary element in the evolution of the 
IACtHR jurisprudence.21 Neuman has voiced the criticism that the element of consensus 
is rarely present in the IAHRS.22 As he points out 'the Court cannot easily borrow 
legitimation for its interpretations of the ACHR from the one OAS institution most 
heavily engaged in human rights promotion, the Inter-American Commission. The 
Commission is an expert body, not an intergovernmental body, and it cannot 
express political consent on behalf of the member states. Moreover, the Court’s 
opinions generally treat the Commission as a hierarchical subordinate that proposes 
arguments for the Court’s consideration, rather than as an independent source of 
expertise on the elaboration of human rights norms'.23
In Neuman’s view, the reliance on a ‘consensus building process’ could improve the 
acceptance and effectiveness of the IAHRS.
Second, one can observe an increasing judicial dialogue between the IACtHR and the 
ECtHR.24 In the 1980s and 1990s, the IACtHR was mirroring its European peer. At that 
time, there was a mere ‘borrowing from the other Court’; today the IACtHR has arrived at 
a stage in which there are cross references between the ECtHR and the IACtHR. This 
translates into an incipient judicial dialogue. The IACtHR resorts to the case law of the 
ECtHR interpreted together with constitutional traditions of the state parties.25 The 
ECtHR as discussed below has started quoting the IACtHR case law in some cases, includ-
ing those relating to migrants’ rights. This judicial dialogue in terms of migrants’ rights 
does not necessarily indicate an entire convergence of the practice of both regional 
courts. From a socio-legal perspective, Dembour’s comparative study between the 
EHRS and the IAHRS has underlined the differences between the respective approaches 
to migrants’ rights. According to Dembour, whereas the Strasbourg case law considers 
‘the migrant applicant first of all as an alien who is subject to the control of the state, 
rather than just a human being’; in the IACtHR system the protection granted to migrants 
relies on the principle of equality before the law and the pro-homine principle.26 This is,
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the in words of Dembour, from an outsider’s perspective ‘one of the most striking features 
of the Inter-American case law’.27
Third, the judicial dialogue between the IACtHR and national courts (particularly 
supreme or constitutional courts) has been strengthened via the principle of ‘interpreta-
cion conforme’ (consistent interpretation) and the ‘control de convencionalidad’ (conven-
tionality control).28
By way of the first principle, national courts must align the interpretation of domestic 
law with the ACHR. Art. 29 b IACHR which requires consistent interpretation of human 
rights stan-dards whenever the national judge has to interpret a human rights provision.29 
The confor-mity with the ACHR has been at the centre of several cases brought before the 
Court.
Through the second mechanism, national courts scrutinise the legality of state parties’ 
actions in light of the obligations assumed under the ACHR.30 The ‘control of convention-
ality’ was a development from the IACtHR’s judgment in Almonacid Arellano et al.v. Chile, where the IACtHR held that:
when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, its judges,
as part of the State, are also bound by such Convention. This forces them to see that all the
effects of the provisions embodied in the Convention are not adversely affected by the enfor-
cement of laws which are contrary to its purpose and that have not had any legal effects since
their inception. In other words, the Judiciary must exercise a sort of ‘conventionality control’
between the domestic legal provisions which are applied to specific cases and the American
Convention on Human Rights. To perform this task, the Judiciary has to take into account
not only the treaty, but also the interpretation thereof made by the Inter-American Court,
which is the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention.31
Both mechanisms have enabled constructive relationships and provided clarity and gui-
dance for domestic courts in future proceedings, so it will be of interest to jurists seeking
a suitable model for cooperation for other regional human rights systems. As Benvenisti
and Down argue that this inter-judicial cooperation provides ‘courts with a viable strategy
for both protecting their authority and safeguarding the domestic democratic processes’.32
A common feature of these mechanisms is that they are built around the government’s
responsibility to ensure that the application of domestic law does not undermine the rights
under the ACHR; at the same time, they reduce the margin of appreciation of national
authorities because they should follow the interpretation by the IACtHR. Here, the
term ‘margin of appreciation’ (discussed in depth in section 3) is used with the
meaning coined in European human rights law: it refers to the space for manoeuvre
that the ECtHR allows to national authorities, in order to fulfil their obligations under
the European Convention on Human Rights.33
The judicial dialogue between the IACtHR and national courts is not however always
smooth and clashes do take place as discussed in section 4. Notwithstanding that, like Ben-
venisti and Down proclaim ‘while competition between the two sets of actors is probably
inescapable, they are also increasingly dependent on each other and mutually vulnerable
(…) international courts are likely to tolerate increased domestic court review’.34
Fourth, the interaction between the IACtHR and the IACHRhas shaped the evolution of
the case law.Different types of interaction and an enhanced collaboration occurred between
the twomain human rights monitoring bodies. Cooperation can be observed in the request
for preliminary measures in cases of massive expulsions of immigrants. However, the com-
plete agreement between the two human rights bodies should not be taken for granted.
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The independence of the IACtHR has been asserted through the construction of its own  
legal arguments since, as a judicial organ, the IACtHR follows the prin-ciple iura novit 
curia and, therefore, it knows the relevant provisions to be applied inde-pendently of the 
law pleaded by the IACHR or the parties.35
From a procedural perspective, the recent reform of the ACHR’s Rules of Procedure, 
concluded in 2013 after two years of intense discussions, brought new changes to the 
relations between the two main organs.36 The main reason behind the reform was to 
tackle some weaknesses observed in the procedure before the IACHR. Although the 
reform was long-awaited, it raised concerns about undermining the IACHR’s powers.37 
One aspect was especially contentious: the proposal contained provisions limiting the 
IACHR’s powers to adopt precautionary measures in the event of a lack of agreement 
between the IACtHR and the IACHR.38 The current text reads:
12. The Commission may present a request for provisional measures to the Inter-American
Court in accordance with the conditions established in Article 76 of these Rules (…) 13. In
the case of a decision of the Inter-American Court dismissing an application for provisional
measures, the Commission shall not consider a new request for precautionary measures
unless there are new facts that justify it. In any case, the Commission may consider the
use of other mechanisms to monitor the situation.39
Taking into consideration the reform, these rules containing additional clarifications seem
to have reinforced the IACtHR’s functions, further empowering it.40
Finally, the IACtHR has affirmed core international human rights law principles in its
advisory opinions. The controversial question here regards the effect that these advisory
opinions have on the OAS member states’ legal orders. While the IACtHR’s judgments
may become legal yardsticks for national legal systems, advisory opinions do not carry
any binding force. In accordance with the provisions of the ACHR, the IACtHR exercises
its contentious jurisdiction only over the signatories to the ACHR, which are mostly Latin
American states. In ideal circumstances, the IACtHR should be considered as exercising its
influence on all of the OAS member states. Nonetheless, the United States and Canada
have not become parties to the ACHR, only a few Caribbean states have ratified it, and
recently Venezuela denounced the treaty.41
The IACtHR has however asserted the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction as a way to
convey a clear message to all OAS member states, including those who are not parties
to the ACHR as will be discussed in detail below. In this quest for a comprehensive
and mandatory legal solution, the main underlying feature is the attempt to identify
and assert jus cogens principles that are binding upon all states and also project a
horizontal effect on relations between private parties.42 Hence, the IACtHR has
issued, in particular, advisory opinions affirming principles of international
human rights law, such as non-discrimination, equality before the law and non-
refoulement.43
Furthermore, the IACtHR has relied on the horizontal effect or drittwirkung theory
(that is, fundamental rights should be respected by both the public authorities and by indi-
viduals vis-à-vis other individuals),44 which is re-affirmed in the advisory opinions con-
cerning migrants’ rights that are analysed in Section 4. Certainly, one of the issues that
repeatedly emerges in the case law concerning migrants is the horizontal effect of
human rights provisions.
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In sum, the IACtHR’s process of evolution has been harnessed through a variety of dis-
tinctive tools that have led to a particular scenario. On the one hand, the IACtHR has been
eager to reinforce core principles through its decisions and advisory opinions, especially in
a fast-fragmenting legal landscape that features increasingly important issues in the pro-
tection of human rights. On the other hand, founded by a specific treaty ratified by only
certain OAS member states, the IACtHR has been scrambling to involve non-contracting
states of the ACHR.
3. The protection of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants’ rights in the
case law of the IACtHR: between idealism and reality
Over the years, the IACtHR has spelt out normative standards for the protection of refu-
gees, asylum seekers and migrants, contributing to regional and international human
rights law in a progressive interpretation of human rights treaties.45 Consequently, the
IACtHR has given rise to a significant body of case law through both judgments and advi-
sory opinions, as well as by the adoption of provisional measures aimed at protecting refu-
gees and asylum seekers, extending the protection to all migrants (regardless of their
migratory status) particularly those who face collective expulsions. Cantor and Barichello
rightly point out that the IACtHR has built up a complementary protection regime in
human rights law for persons who have international protection needs despite not
being refugees.46 In exercising its jurisdiction, the IACtHR has adopted inter-American
human rights standards on the protection of the right to life, personal integrity,
freedom of movement and residence of refugees and asylum seekers as well as undocu-
mented migrants, their families and child migrants.47
The main tool used by the IACtHR has been a progressive interpretation not only of
human rights treaties but also of other international treaties that might have an impact
on the safeguarding of human rights. The Court has operated in two different manners.
First and foremost, in the exercise of its contentious jurisdiction it has put forward an evol-
ving and contextual interpretation of human rights instruments while examining cases
submitted against state parties to the American Convention. Second, the Court has
demonstrated its endeavours to hold other states to account through the adoption of a
specific advisory opinion reinforcing the obligations of the states under the ADHR. In
brief, the scope of the Court’s advisory function comprises not only the states parties to
the American Convention but all the OAS member states that have adopted the ADHR,
irrespective of whether they have ratified the American Convention, and the organs of
the OAS whose sphere of competence relates to the subject matter of the request.48
Another development is the amicus curiae (friends of the Court) submissions, specifi-
cally regarding the protection of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants’ rights.49 The
amicus curiae briefs of non-governmental human rights organisations have ‘demonstrated
a clear tendency for liberal interpretation, a position eventually adopted by the Court’.50
Advisory Opinion (AO) 18/03, addressing the recognition of undocumented migrant
workers’ rights in the IAHRS, lies at the centre of this evolution. In this advisory
opinion the Court, following the request by Mexico,51 was called on to determine if a
state could justify the denial of labour rights based on migratory status andAQ4
¶
whether
that status the obligation to guarantee and protect human rights and the principle of
equality and non-discrimination were to be considered expression norms of jus
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cogens.52 More than 50 civil rights, migrants’ rights and workers’ rights organisations filed
amicus curiae briefs.53 This is probably one of the most cited advisory opinions of the
Court and represents a significant contribution to the evolution of international human
rights law.54 Nevertheless, AO 18/03 has also stirred controversy about the Court’s
interpretation of jus cogens and erga omnes norms, as discussed below.55
Acting also within the scope of its advisory jurisdiction, the Court handed down AO 21/
14 on the Rights and Guarantees of Children in the context of migration and/or in need of
international protection,56 upon the joint request by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and
Uruguay which asked the IACtHR to determine the scope of state obligations regarding
the rights of child migrants under the ACHR, the ADHR and the Inter-American Conven-
tion to Prevent and Punish Torture.57
This advisory opinion features several considerations that draw upon the precedents.
Specifically, the IACtHR referred to the exercise of its advisory competence clarifying that:
the broad scope of its advisory function, unique in contemporary international law, owing to
which, and contrary to the attributes of other international courts, all the organs of the OAS
listed in Chapter X of the Charter and the Member States of the OAS are authorized to
request advisory opinions, even if they are not parties to the Convention. Another character-
istic of the breadth of this function relates to the purpose of the consultation, which is not
limited to the American Convention, but includes other treaties concerning the protection
of human rights in the States of the Americas.58
Certain core aspects that stem from the Court’s rulings in contentious cases and from the 
AO underpinning the protection of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants’ rights that 
deserve special attention for the present analysis are: the doctrine of margin of appreci-
ation; the nature of jus cogens of human rights provisions vis-à-vis refugees and undocu-
mented migrants; the application of the principle of non-refoulement in the context of 
deportations; the consideration given to the vulnerability of the petitioners; reparations 
in case of violation of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants’ rights and the monitoring 
of compliance with the Court’s judgments.
3.1. Migrants’ rights and margin of appreciation
Unlike in the EHRS, in the IAHRS the doctrine of margin of appreciation has traditionally 
had less influence.59 Chiefly, this is due to the lack of express reference to the doctrine in 
the ACHR or the ADHR. Hence, the scholarship is divided as to the applicability of the 
doctrine. Núñez Poblete rightly reminds that while some scholars (such as Faundez 
Ledesma) have admitted that possibility; other doctrinal positions (led by Judge Cancado 
Trindade) have reduced the sphere of its application.60 In practice, the broader or limited 
scope of the margin of appreciation in the IAHRS varies according to the rights 
protected. Clearly, there is no margin of appreciation possible in cases concerning 
mass violations of human rights which occurred during dictatorships in different Latin 
American countries and regarding amnesty laws.61
In recent years there have been attempts on the part of American states to affirm the 
application of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation when implementing their 
national migration policies. AO 18/03 of the IACtHR confirmed that American states 
enjoy a certain margin of appreciation while adopting their own migration policy, but
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emphatically reiterated that they are bound to respect international human rights law and
to observe the principle of equality before the law without discrimination.62
In Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic (2000), a
landmark case in the protection of undocumented migrants, the Court ordered provisional
measures to suspend collective expulsions upon the commission’s request, granting
interim relief to protect specific individuals.63 On the margin of manoeuvre of the
states, the Court determined that, although it is an attribute of the Dominican Republic
to adopt sovereign decisions about its immigration policy, these must be compatible
with the protection of human rights in light of the ACHR.64
Drawing on this previous case relating to the prohibition of collective expulsions as a
clear limit to the margin of appreciation, in Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic
(2012) the IACtHR held that the personal circumstances of each individual must be eval-
uated during deportation proceedings, in compliance with the prohibition of collective
expulsions.65 The Court concluded that in that case there had been a collective expulsion
in violation of Article 22(9) of the ACHR, which had been alleged by the petitioners but
not by the Commission.66
In AO 21/14, the IACtHR took the view that, when a child has a right to nationality or is
legally residing in a country, the child’s right to family life under the ACHR and the ADHR
precludes the possibility that the child’s parents will be expelled from the country in ques-
tion due to immigration offenses.67 At this point, the Court placed a restriction on states’
margin of appreciation as they have the obligation to weigh its legitimate interests against
those of the family in the context of each specific case, ensuring ‘that the expulsion of one
or both parents does not lead to an abusive or arbitrary interference in the family life of the
child’.68 The IACtHR urged American states to consider the immigration history, the dur-
ation of the stay and ties of the parent to the host country, the children’s nationality, and
the harm and disruption of the child’s life that would occur if the family were divided ‘to
weigh all these circumstances rigorously in light of the best interest of the child in relation
to the essential public interest that should be protected’.69
3.2. Jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations
As a way of reaching out to all the American states regardless of their acceptance of the
IACtHR’s jurisdiction, the Court has heavily relied (with more or less success) on the
identification of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations. Turning to the issue of
jus cogens norms, in AO 18/03 the IACtHR submitted that the principle of non-discrimi-
nation and equal treatment belongs to jus cogens,70 being thus ‘applicable to all States,
regardless of whether or not they are a party to a specific international treaty’.71 Moreover,
the Court took the view that this principle entails obligations erga omnes that apply to
third parties, including states and individuals.72
The IACtHR discussed in detail the norms of international human rights law applicable
to migrant workers, particularly the International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW), identifying
the principles in the light of which the status and the entitlement of rights of undocumen-
ted migrant workers should be considered. Furthermore, the IACtHR went on specifically
to mention several labour rights that must be guaranteed to international migrant workers
regardless of their immigration status, such as: the prohibition of forced labour; the
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prohibition of child labour; special care for women workers; freedom of association and to
organise and join a trade union, collective negotiation; fair wages for work performed;
social security; judicial and administrative guarantees; a working day of reasonable
length with adequate working conditions (safety and health), rest and compensation.73
In her study about the process leading to the adoption of AO 18/03, Beth Lyon submits
that the IACtHR developed a non-discrimination balancing test, ‘favoring parity of pro-
tection for unauthorized workers’ based on their vulnerability.74 At the same time, as a
main criticism, she considers that even if the IACtHR mentioned several economic, cul-
tural and social rights, there was not real upholding of such rights.75
In Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic (2014), the Court
addressed the prohibition of non-discrimination as a jus cogens norm in the context of
arbitrary detention and summary expulsion by the Dominican Republic of Haitians and
Dominicans of Haitian descent, including children.76 The IACtHR found that ‘there
were a number of impediments to how Haitian migrants could enrol their children
born in Dominican territory’ and to obtain Dominican citizenship by persons of
Haitian descent born in the Dominican Republic, in contravention of American Conven-
tion and Recommendation 10 of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination.77
Notably, one of the main controversial issues regards the IACtHR’s position on jus
cogens (or peremptory norms) and erga omnes obligations, that is, obligations which
are the concern of all states (a concept introduced by the International Court of Justice
in the 1970 Barcelona Traction case).78 As Michael Byers contends, although jus cogens
norms possess erga omnes effects, not all norms having an erga omnes effect belong to
jus cogens.79 There is also a long-held discussion amongst international law scholars as
to the ways of creating jus cogens norms. De Wet argues that the IACtHR seems to
have relied on natural law to uphold the ‘universal acceptance’ of the prohibition of dis-
crimination.80 It appears that whereas most of the international law scholarship sides with
a more voluntarist approach (that is, jus cogens norms produced though customary law),
following the IACtHR’s position, jus cogens norms would derive from natural law prin-
ciples. This brings us back to the issue of regional consent and to the effectiveness of
jus cogens norms in the IAHRS. As De Wet rightly concludes ‘practice has illustrated
that the recognition of the peremptory status of a particular norm is no guarantee for
effective enforcement of the norm and the values it represents’.81 This controversy is
further developed in section 4.
3.3. Non-refoulement and procedural guarantees in cases of expulsion: the
inter-American way
Historically, the IACtHR has followed in the footsteps of the ECtHR in affirming the non-
refoulement principle, that is, ‘no one can be sent back to where they would face torture or
human or degrading treatment or punishment contrary to article 3 of the ECHR’.82 The
application of this principle implies the prohibition of the expulsion or forced return
(‘refoulement’) of a refugee to a country ‘where his life or freedom would be threatened
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion’.83 This principle has been recognised at international and at regional
level in different human rights treaties.84 Under the ECHR the principle does not admit
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exceptions on grounds of public order or national security, initially allowed by article 33 of
the 1951 Geneva Convention. At present, it can be said that there are conclusive argu-
ments for considering the non-refoulement principle as part of customary international
law.85 In the context of immigration, the principle of non-refoulement implies the immedi-
ate verification (before removal) of whether the individual has the right to file an appli-
cation to determine refugee status or to apply for complementary protection.86
In recent years, the IACtHR has generated a number of cases relating to procedural
guarantees in the context of deportations upholding the protection of the principle of
non-refoulement, widening the scope of protection accorded by the 1951 Geneva Conven-
tion.87 As Cantor and Barichello explain, ‘the Inter-American system has also developed a
range of specialised human rights-based protections against removal to harm that are
“complementary” to those that exist in international refugee law’ and that are ‘often
termed “non-refoulement” in the literature’.88
Accordingly, in Vélez Loor v. Panama (2010),89 a case involving the deportation of an
Ecuadorian citizen by Panama’s authorities after being allegedly tortured during his deten-
tion, the Court asserted that the state had violated the petitioner’s rights to access to
justice, personal liberty and freedom.90 In Pacheco Tineo Family v. Bolivia (2013), the
question at issue was the violation of the right to seek and be granted asylum, of the
non-refoulement obligations and of the due process guarantees.91 The highlight of the
case is the IACtHR’s interpretation of Article 22.8 of the ACHR, which prohibits the
expulsion or return of any
alien to a country, regardless of whether or not it is his country of origin (…) if in that
country his right to life or personal freedom is in danger of being violated because of his
race, nationality, religion, social status, or political opinions.92
In AO 21/14 the IACtHR acknowledged that in ‘situations of a mass influx of persons’,
individual determination may be impracticable, but even in these cases, states should guar-
antee access to ‘protection from refoulement, and basic humanitarian treatment’.93 The
requesting states specifically asked the IACtHR to provide its opinion on the procedures
necessary to identify the needs of child migrants and child refugees; procedures used to
assess requests for asylum or recognition of refugee status; the span of the principle of
non-refoulement and the due process guarantees governing immigration proceedings,
amongst other basic guarantees.94 As for the principle of non-refoulement,95 the
IACtHR affirmed its nature as a jus cogens norm of customary international law legally
binding on all states, which must implement positive measures to guarantee it.96
Henceforth, the Court widened the scope of the principle of non-refoulement, uphold-
ing the right of any alien (not only refugees) not to be returned when his or her life, integ-
rity and/or freedom are at risk of being violated, without taking into account the person’s
legal status or migratory condition in the country where he or she is staying.
3.4. The vulnerability of the right-holder and the special protection granted to
child migrants and refugees
In the protection of migrants’ rights the vulnerability of the victims as right-holders con-
stitutes a central element in the jurisprudence of the IACtHR. Although the ECtHR has
also referred to the question of the vulnerability in alike cases, the manner in which the
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concept is construed in the inter-American system has particular imprints, as appreciated
in specific rulings.
At the outset, it should be noted that the concept of vulnerability in international
human rights law remains vague. As argued by Peroni and Timmer, the concept has
different meanings. For the purpose of this article the notion of human vulnerability
is based
on four assumptions: the inescapable vulnerability of human beings as embodied agents; the
resultant dependency of humans on each other (…); the general reciprocity and social inter-
connectedness of the live world; and finally, the inevitable precariousness and fragility of
social institutions.97
The protection of vulnerable groups has been referred to by the ECtHR in cases concern-
ing asylum seekers and the situation of undocumented migrants according to Beduschi ‘as
one of the criteria allowing for the interpretation of ill-treatment under Article 3 of the
ECHR’ in cases like Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, Hirsi Jamaa
and Others v. Italy and V. M. and others v. Belgium.98
Before the IACtHR, the vulnerability of the victims has been relied upon to determine
the violation of rights and the extension of the reparations. Precisely, in AO 18/03 the
IACtHR based its legal reasoning on the vulnerability of undocumented migrants, empha-
sising that they are often victims of trafficking, discrimination and xenophobia because of
their status and their lack of entitlement to basic rights. The IACtHR asserted that the irre-
gular status of an individual cannot deprive him or her of the entitlement and exercise of
fundamental rights (including the right to due process) granted in the ACHR and other
international instruments, confirming previous case law.99
In the exercise of both adjudicatory and advisory jurisdiction, the IACtHR had to con-
front the complex question of the protection of child migrants, an area where severe cases
of violation of human rights occur.100 Again, the question of vulnerability is placed at the
centre of the Court’s analysis for it to lay down a specialised subset of normative standards
aimed at protecting child migrants. Hence, in the landmark Case of the Girls Yean and
Bosico v. Dominican Republic (2005) the IACtHR granted protection to two children
born to Haitian parents in the Dominican Republic, whose immigration status was ques-
tioned by the Dominican authorities.101 Before the IACtHR, the petitioners alleged that
the Dominican Republic had denied Dominican nationality to children born on its soil
even though the Dominican constitution is governed in this matter by the principle of
jus soli and refused to register the children, because at their births their parents were
present in the Dominican Republic as undocumented migrants and lacked the necessary
documents to enrol them.102 As a result, the children’s legal condition was that of undo-
cumented migrants subject to deportation.
What is relevant here is the technique used by the Court to grant protection to the chil-
dren at risk. The IACtHR referred to the vulnerability of the two girls, describing their
situation as a ‘legal limbo’, since they were stateless and at risk of being deported and sep-
arated from their families. In an innovative manner, the Court referred to the UN Con-
vention against Statelessness as an interpretative tool, even though the Dominican
Republic is not party to it.103 The Court went on to assert that the right to a basic edu-
cation must be guaranteed to all children regardless of their status, aligning the protection
with the progressive development clause proclaiming that
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in the light of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Additional Protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in relation
to the obligation to ensure progressive development contained in Article 26 of the American
Convention, the State must provide free primary education to all children in an appropriate
environment and in the conditions necessary to ensure their full intellectual development.104
Building on AO 17/02 on the Juridical Status and Human Rights of the Child,105 the
IACtHR upheld the principle of non-discrimination and the superior interest of the
child as core elements for the protection of child migrants. Specifically, it found that
the Dominican Republic had discriminated against minors by denying them citizenship
because of their Haitian background, acting ‘arbitrarily, without using reasonable and
objective criteria, and in a way that was contrary to the superior interest of the
child’.106 Moreover, the IACtHR explained that ‘the obligation to respect and ensure
the principle of the right to equal protection and non-discrimination is irrespective of a
person’s migratory status in a State’.107
Particularly, in AO 21/14 the request focused on the vulnerability of child migrants
leaving Latin America and the Caribbean, underlying that both irregular migrants and
children ‘require (…) a special commitment on the part of states’ taking into consideration
the ‘prevailing detention, criminalization, and treatment of child migrants’.108
In tackling the points raised in the request, the Court indicated that the ACHR and the
ADHR oblige states to articulate initial evaluation processes to identify and address the
individualised needs of child migrants to define the child’s age, nationality, whether the
child is unaccompanied or separated from its family, the reasons for the child’s departure,
and if the child needs international protection or special measures for protection.109
Specifically referring to asylum seekers, the IACtHR held that states have a duty to
‘provide children with real access to these procedures’.110 These measures should
include not impeding the child’s entry into the country, giving individuals access to the
entities that can determine their status, priority processing for children, health evaluations,
examinations conducted in a manner that does not re-traumatise the child, providing
accommodation, issuing an identity document to avoid return, and assigning an indepen-
dent and trained guardian to the case.111
The IACtHR went on to set several standards of protection and to assert based on their
vulnerability that states may not place child migrants in detention as a precautionary
measure for solely ‘migratory reasons’ (a right which also extends to their families), since
this constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of liberty against the ACHR and the ADHR.112 In
the Court’s view, as a general rule the state has the duty to separate children from adults
in accommodation centres, states should allow entry and exit and must provide housing,
medical care, legal assistance, educational support, and specialised care to the children.113
In terms of procedural guarantees, the Court determined that the American Convention
and Declaration require states to observe special guarantees of due process for children in
migratory proceedings,114 and that the decisions adopted must be in the child’s best
interest.115
3.5. Defining new forms of reparation and improving compliance
These are two interrelated aspects which hold the key to achieving the effectiveness of the
judgments and to improving refugees’ and migrants’ lives. Notably, reparations represent
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the crucial aspect in recent contentious cases relating to the protection of asylum seekers’,
refugees’ and migrants’ rights.116 Adding to the traditional forms of reparations, the
IACtHR has been innovative ordering concerned states to take different reparation
measures. As Grossman et al. underline, the Court, through the ‘creative’ interpretation
of Article 63 of the ACHR, has developed within the limits of its jurisdiction the law of
reparation to include ‘material and moral damages, symbolic measures of redress, as
well as legislative changes when needed’.117
In Velez Loor v. Panama, the upshot of the ruling is that the IACtHR took on a panoply
of reparation measures ordering the state in question to provide medical and psychological
treatment; publish the judgment; investigate acts of torture and identify, prosecute, and
punish those responsible; separate inmates imprisoned for immigration violations from
those imprisoned for criminal offenses; bring prisons into compliance with international
standards; train government officials; and ensure that immigration laws conform to the
ACHR.118 In Pacheco Tineo the IACtHR ordered measures such as to pay compensation
to the petitioners, to publish the judgment and implement permanent training pro-
grammes directed towards government agents and officials who due to their functions
might have contact with migrants and asylum seekers.
Whilst this ample catalogue of reparation measures may be perceived as progress by the
petitioners, the non-compliance with the IACtHR rulings still constitutes the Achilles’ heel
of the system. In the Strasburg system the supervision of the execution of the judgments
falls within the Parliamentary Assembly’s functions, in the IAHRS the commission and the
Court are in charge of monitoring compliance.119
In the IAHRS, domestic constraints related to the particular legal environment in which
judgments need to be implemented are evident. Space precludes the author from a detailed
and thorough analysis of the factors that may hinder the successful application of the
rulings. Just to mention the most important from a purely legal perspective: compliance
with the rulings depends on the particular approach to inter-American human rights
law taken in the constitution. More broadly, Beduschi refers to the political and economic
context of the contracting states as main factors behind the lack of compliance with the
IACtHR’s rulings.120 However, generalisations are risky in this regard and may depict a
distorted scenario as some contracting states are successfully implementing the Court’s
rulings. To illustrate, Baillie highlights that the 2001–2006 statistics (compiled by Basch
et al.) show 47% compliance of victim-oriented reparations ordered (approximately
61% of the total) in countries from Argentina to Venezuela; whereas there was 24% com-
pliance of the measures ordering an investigation of the violations (accounting for 15% of
the total), except in the case of Mexico which complied with 67% of the orders to inves-
tigate and punish.121 Compliance, therefore, is fragmented and depends on the type of
measure ordered.
The IACtHR has tried to mitigate this circumstance by introducing the supervision of
AQ5 the judgments, allocating the task to a unit within the Court
¶
.122 By using this method,
the Court can guarantee the effectiveness of the rulings determining the degree of compli-
ance with the judgment.123 For instance, in the Court’s report on the monitoring of com-
pliance with the Pachecho Tineo judgment issued in 2015, the IACtHR established that
Bolivia had completely fulfilled the obligations imposed.124 The judgment in Bosico was
monitored on several occasions (2007, 2009, 2010, 2011). This demonstrates that, at the
stage of enforcing final decisions and judgments, the Court has substantially expanded
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its supervisory role ensuring that the judgments (which are legally binding on the parties)
are complied with.125
Overall, it is clear from an assessment of the IACtHR’s role in the safeguarding of
migrants’ rights that the Court has contributed very significantly to the standards incor-
porating the international corpus juris applicable to refugees, asylum seekers and migrant
persons. The Court has defined international protection as the
protection that a state offers to a foreign person because, in his or her country of nationally or
habitual residence, that individual’s human rights are threatened or violated and she or he is
unable to obtain due protection there, because it is not accessible, available and/or
effective.126
In asserting migrants’ rights, the IACtHR has relied not only on the ACHR, but also on the
Protocol of San Salvador on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and other treaties that
may have an impact on the protection of human rights. Against this background, the
IACtHR stressed that states are bound to implement measures within domestic law that
promote the well-being and development of child migrants.127 Although problems in the
implementation of judgments continue to be the main obstacle to their effectiveness,
these judgments are now the object of ad hoc monitoring by the IACtHR. The new
follow-up process regarding the implementation of the IACtHR’s judgments in the dom-
estic jurisdiction may strengthen the protection provided to migrants, ultimately by
placing public pressure on those states found responsible of violations under the IACHR
and the ADHR.128
4. Discussion: is the IACtHR suffering from growing pains?
In more than 30 years of evolution, the IACtHR has not only aided the democratisation of
most Latin American states but also at present addresses the protection of social, economic
and cultural rights. As a result of this evolution, when looking back over the different cases
brought before the IACtHR, it is clear that the IACtHR has built up and enriched its legal
arguments when protecting refugees, asylum seekers and migrants’ rights according to the
standard of ‘vulnerability’, which is defined by the particular situation of the right-holder
(see the discussion in section 3 above). Notably, the protection of migrants’ rights in the
case lawof the IACtHRunveils several key aspects in the evolutionof the judicialmechanism.
The first crucial aspect in the protection of migrants involves the judicial dialogue pro-
cesses in place, comprising the inter-regional dialogue (or horizontal dialogue) with the
ECtHR and the vertical dialogue with the supreme and constitutional courts of the state
parties to the ACHR.
As regards the interaction between regional human rights courts, the ECtHR has
referred to the IACtHR’s early landmark cases, that is, Velásquez Rodríguez, Caballero
Delgado, Villagran-Morales on procedural issues (such as no retroactivity); human right
standards129 and other substantial aspects.130 Nonetheless, perfect reciprocity does not
exist, because the relationship is still unbalanced, as the IACtHR tends to rely more on
its European counterpart than the other way around.131 In addition, a more nuanced
analysis is in order, as there are regional particularities.
The two regional human rights courts have converged in upholding certain principles
that might constitute jus cogens as observed in the protection of ‘core human rights’, such
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as the right to life.132 For instance, the ECtHR cited the Advisory Opinion on the Right to
Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of Due Process
of Law concerning the implication of the guarantees of a fair procedure for Article 4 of the
American Convention on Human Rights. In particular, regarding migrants’ rights in Hirsi
Jamaa and Others v. Italy before the ECtHR, the ruling on Expelled Dominicans and Hai-
tians regarding the prohibition of collective expulsions was quoted in the Concurring
Opinion of Judge Pinto de Alburqueque as follows:
The due procedure provision of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 is of much broader personal scope
than the one provided for in Article 1 of Protocol No. 7, since the former includes all aliens
regardless of their legal and factual status, and the latter includes only aliens lawfully resident
in the expelling State.133
From a related perspective, one of the features predominant in the evolution of the
IACtHR jurisprudence is that the Court is setting international standards and consolidat-
ing customary international law rules on a universal level as observed in recent conten-
tious cases and advisory opinions. There is a confluence in the protection of migrants
regarding particular issues, such as the prohibition of collective expulsions and the protec-
tion of children and unaccompanied minors. Put differently, both courts are forging the
emergence of common universal standards contributing, in particular, to the codification
of the ‘ius migrandi’134 in the case of the prohibition of collective expulsions.135
Concerning the protection of refugee children in the ECtHR’s recent ruling in Abdul-
lahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, judge Pinto de Albuquerque’s Separate
Opinion136 cited Vélez Loor and Pacheco Tineo as examples of a growing practice to
protect migrants137 in the event of mandatory detention of irregular migrants by ordering
the states to verify, through an individualised evaluation, ‘the possibility of using less
restrictive measures’.138 On the criminalisation of the migrants (crimmigration), Judge
Pinto made also a reference to IACHR Resolution 03/08, citing that ‘international stan-
dards establish that detention must be applied only as an exceptional measure and after
having analysed the necessity in each case’.139
Beyond the EHRS and the IAHRS, a brief note on the practice of the African System of
Human Rights (ASHR) is in order, as the ASHR has contributed a growing body of jur-
isprudence in the field.140 The African Commission of Human Rights has addressed the
protection of refugees (particularly of asylum-seeking women and children) in several
cases applying the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the 1969 Conven-
tion Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems. However, there are obstacles in
the submissions of complaints as Bekker underlines
a distinction appears to be drawn between cases where an individual filing an application has
been granted refugee status and those where the complainant is merely an asylum seeker,
seeking redress against the country from which they had fled. In the latter case, the Commis-
sion appears to be reluctant to apply the constructive exhaustion of domestic remedies
principle.141
This circumstance has reduced the number of petitions declared admissible. While the
implementation of the commission’s decisions is seen as a major pitfall of the ASHR,
there are hardly any cases concerning refugees’ rights brought before the African Court
of Human Rights.142 Even though there is no proper judicial dialogue established yet
between the IAHRS and the ASHR, there is a convergence in the practice of regional
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human rights bodies, for instance in the use of vulnerability as a tool to uphold the
protection.
The other type of dialogue that the IACtHR entertains with supreme and constitutional
courts consists of a process of a vertical dialogue or convergence that has been boosted
through two mechanisms referred to previously, namely, the conventionality control
and the consistent interpretation. In the field of migrants’ rights, these two mechanisms
are newly being introduced. The articulation of both mechanisms has had a deep
impact on the manner in which the IACtHR is perceived by national courts and has
paved the way for a more constructive relationship. As argued by Negishi, the
pro-homine principle has played a significant role in articulating this judicial dialogue
as domestic courts have to follow the most favourable interpretation when applying
inter-American human rights law.143 The IACtHR’s rulings on migrants’ rights cases
can provide important clarity and guidance for domestic courts in future proceedings.
These are the two main significant developments of inter-American human rights law
that should be carefully appraised.
The control of conventionality and consistent interpretation appear straightforward:
they reduce the room for manoeuvre of national courts and, at the same time, foster
their active role in the building of the IAHRS.144 Although charming in principle, these
doctrines and the idea of a ‘bottom up’ judicial construction of the inter-American
human rights legal system, as proposed by Dulitzky, may turn out to be a double-edged
sword, especially taking into account two circumstances.145 First, certain member states’
high courts have being reluctant to follow inter-American case law reaffirming the doc-
trine of the margin of appreciation.146 Second, it could then be problematic if a conflict
arises between constitutional law and the IACHR and the national judge gives primacy
to the latter, in which event ultimately the states’ consent will prevail.147
In an assessment of the relations between the two main IAHRS bodies in the matter of
migrant rights, three types of interaction have occurred. Two of them are the traditional
requests for the adoption of provisional measures and the referral of cases to the Court.
There is, to a certain extent, tension between the two bodies in asserting superiority in
the exercise of the protective function. Evidently the IACtHR is still seen by certain
member states as a ‘fastidious watchdog’ of domestic legal systems,148 which may
impede the implementation of provisional measures or final judgments.149 Despite the dis-
agreements between the IACtHR and the IACHR, one needs to bear in mind that, ulti-
mately, inter-American human rights bodies are carrying all of the heavy tasks of
promoting and protecting human rights. As Pascqualucci recalls, there is a lack of
support on the part of the political organs to exert pressure on states to assure compliance
with international and regional human rights law.150
In terms of building a body of jurisprudence on migrants’ rights in inter-American
human rights law, AOs 18/03 and 21/14 are regarded as masterpieces. In the IACtHR’s
view, these advisory opinions are not only addressed to American states: they purport
to reflect principles of international human rights law belonging to jus cogens. AO
18/03 evidences the crystallisation of jus cogens norms, such as non-discrimination. In
the last advisory opinion on child migrants, the IACtHR reaffirmed that, through advisory
opinions it can reach states that are not parties to the pact. This is a subtle way to circum-
vent the jurisdictional problems, notably, that apart from Latin American states, the Car-
ibbean states have scarcely recognised the Court’s jurisdiction, and Canada and the United
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States are not under the contentious jurisdiction. Referring to the jus cogens nature of the
norms, Judge Cançado Trindade reaffirmed that
the State cannot avail itself of the fact of not being a Party to a given treaty of human rights to
evade the obligation to respect the fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination,
for being this latter a principle of general international law, and of jus cogens, which thus
transcends the domain of the law of treaties.151
On the other hand, such states can simply ignore the IACtHR advisory opinions, which
may make the IACtHR a paper tiger.
The IACtHR has signalled a clear turn from the past in the application of the drittwir-
kung theory by underlying the emergence and the scope of the obligations of protection
erga omnes (in their horizontal and vertical dimensions).152 Judge Cançado Trindade
pointed out: ‘The State is bound by the corpus juris of the international protection of
human rights, which protects every human person erga omnes, independently of her
statute of citizenship (sic), or of migration, or any other condition or circumstance’
being binding on ‘the public power and likewise to the private persons or individuals
(e.g. employers), in the inter-individual relations’.153
Furthermore, in AO 21/14, the IACtHR held that
Article 5 of the American Convention, read together with the obligations erga omnes to
respect and ensure respect for the norms that protect human rights, reveals the obligation
of the State not to deport, return, expel, extradite, or remove in any other way to another
State a person who is subject to its jurisdiction, or to a third State that is unsafe, when
there are grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to torture,
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.154
This particularly profuse manner of endorsing the peculiar characteristic of peremptory
norms of international law by the IACtHR has attracted criticism in the international
law scholarship. Referring to AO 18/03, Bianchi has warned of the risks of this ‘somewhat
axiomatic reasoning of the Court, linked with fairly vague notions of natural law (…) unli-
kely to foster the cause of jus cogens, particularly among the sceptics’.155
Notwithstanding this criticism in the international law scholarship, in AO 21/14, the
IACtHR took a more cautious approach to jus cogens, referring to it only when mentioning
two central principles for the protection of migrants’ rights: the ‘peremptory prohibition
contained in customary international law of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment’156 and the principle of ‘non-return or non-refoulement’.157
As can be appreciated, with regard to the treaty interpretation in cases dealing with
migrants’ rights, the IACtHR has used the various methods encompassed in both
article 31 of the VCLT and article 29 of the ACHR to extend the scope of protection.
The judgments are imbued with a sense of social justice and equality that permeates the
legal reasoning and indicates that the inter-American human rights law has experienced
a transition. Amicus curiae briefs have also contributed to develop the IACtHR’s legal
reasoning. Even if the IACtHR is eager to embrace an expansive interpretation,
however, there are constraints.
Thus, the IACtHR has alternated between two main conceptions: the voluntarist para-
digm of state-based international law and the new jus gentium that reaffirms the ideal of
justice based on general principles of law. As Hennebel points out: ‘Cançado Trindade
drew up the equations which governed the construction of the new jus gentium’.158
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Whereas the ‘consensus theory’ has gained considerable support with scholarly works like 
Neumann’s, which advocates in its favour, there are some alarming factors observed in the 
practice of the European human rights system, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation 
has been widely accepted. As Benvenisti rightly states, there is a risk that ‘universal 
aspirations are, to a large extent, compromised by the doctrine of margin of 
appreciation’.159 In the inter-American system its use has been less fre-quent except in 
the field of migrant rights, in which a clear vindication of the right to a certain margin 
of manoeuvre on the part of the state parties is more evident. 
In sum, the IACtHR seems to be perilously juggling different methodological 
approaches in its rulings without being fully aware of the unintended consequences. A 
more cautious approach is in order. Rather than looking at the IACtHR’s methodology 
through rose-tinted lenses, embellishing the analysis with fancy adjectives, its prac-
titioners/proponents should conclude that its maturity also requires developing a more 
conscious jurisprudential approach.
5. Conclusions
The analysis of the evolution of the IACtHR’s case law demonstrates that the specialisation 
of the IAHRS has been based on the protection of migrants as a vulnerable group. This 
evolution has been fostered by the judicial dialogue between the IACtHR and the 
ECtHR, in which the ECtHR has at times drawn innovative insights from the jurispru-
dence of its counterpart, for example on procedural issues such as no retroactivity, or 
the right to a fair procedure during collective expulsion. Moreover, progress has also 
been advanced by the judicial dialogue with the supreme and constitutional courts of 
the contracting states, which has enabled constructive relationships and has provided 
clarity and guidance for domestic courts in future proceedings. Other regional human 
rights systems, such as the African model, could profit from these insights. This analysis 
also reveals that relations between the two main inter-American human rights bodies are 
complex and multifaceted.
In this recent and ongoing progress, the case law of the IACtHR relating to the protec-
tion of migrants’ rights reflects the adoption of distinctive and important minimum stan-
dards for the protection of migrants regardless of their legal status. This set of basic human 
rights comprises such rights as the right to life, security of person, and procedural guar-
antees. In addition to safeguarding the exercise of fundamental rights in the case of undo-
cumented migrants as shown through AO 18/03 and in the case of Dilcia Yean and Violeta 
Bosico v. Dominican Republic. Undoubtedly, the IACtHR has played a significant role in 
the expansion of the protection providing new grounds to upholding undocumented 
migrant workers’ rights. The entitlement to certain economic, social and cultural rights 
has been endorsed by the Court, even though there is a twilight zone in which the entitle-
ment to certain rights is still disputed.
The maturity of the Court is evident in this field. The case law demonstrates that the 
Court has extended the original scope of protection of undocumented migrants by 
relying on the evolving interpretation of the ACHR; one can conclude furthermore that 
there is continuity in building up a corpus of jurisprudence. Lessons may be learned for 
other regional systems. In particular, the introduction of a specific mechanism to assess 
compliance or non-compliance may be useful for other regional human rights systems
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(such as the African one) to overcome difficulties experienced in this regard. One out-
standing issue remains, however. There is the question of the interrelations between the
Court’s judgments and the moral force of the advisory opinions: although the Court
has attempted to give teeth to the advisory opinions by reaffirming their binding
nature, they are still considered by certain OASmember states as merely recommendatory.
The IACtHR has gradually developed its jurisprudence through its body of case law,
aiming to bring new jurisprudential principles to bear upon the protection of migrants,
broadening its mandate, and increasing the synergies with the IACHR. In doing so, the
IACtHR has been progressively extending the scope of protection, but it must be acknowl-
edged that the IACtHR is also facing growing pains. There are relevant contentious cases
that are not brought before the IACtHR and, despite its tremendous efforts in applying the
principles embodied in the advisory opinions, serious doubts remain in terms of some of
the approaches taken, particularly with regard to the assertion of jus cogens as examined
above. In a realistic appraisal of the system, the IACtHR (without restraining itself) could
take account of the progress attained and adopt a more cautious and reasoned justification
towards jus cogens norms in order to remain true to its mission.
Meanwhile, however, its distinctive achievements will be of interest to jurists in other
human rights systems, not only to those working in the fields of undocumented migrant
protection but also to all those interested in the evolution and expansion of core principles
for the protection of fundamental human rights.
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